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What the Supreme Court is likely to do in the presently pending case Google v. Oracle. 
By: Jennifer Campbell 
I. Introduction 
Advances in technology, specifically relating to computer science, have evolved rapidly, and it 
has been difficult for the law to keep up.1 The pending U.S. Supreme Court case, Google LLC v. Oracle 
America, Inc., demonstrates some issues that have emerged in copyright law with the rapid growth of 
technology in computer science. 
In 2008, Google released its Android platform, software that Google and other manufacturers use 
in smartphones and tablets.2 Since Android’s release, Google has produced over $42 billion in revenue 
solely from the Android platform’s advertising.3  After Oracle America acquired Sun Microsystems in 
2010, it filed suit against Google, alleging that Google’s Android platform infringed on Oracle’s Java SE 
platform.4 The litigation between Oracle America and Google has been ongoing for a decade, and now the 
litigation is pending before the U.S. Supreme Court.5 The dispute stems from Google’s use of computer 
programs, known as application programming interfaces, or API packages, written in the Java language to 
develop the Android platform.6 Software interfaces, like the APIs at issue, are “functional systems or 
methods of operating a computer program or platform” and “merely describe what functional tasks a 
computer program will perform without specifying how it does so.”7 Software interfaces are organized by 
what courts commonly refer to as the “structure, sequence, and organization.”8 The Java platform is an 
innovative platform that was the first to allow computer programmers to write one program that could run 
 
1 See Computer Associates International, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 696 (2d Cir. 1992). 
2 Oracle America, Inc. v. Google LLC, 886 F.3d 1179, 1187-88 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 
3 Id. at 1187. 
4 See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 7, Google LLC v. Oracle America, Inc. (argued Oct. 7, 2020) (No. 18-956), 
2019 WL 338902. 
5 See Oracle America, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 872 F. Supp. 2d 974, 974 (N.D. Cal. 2012); Petition for Writ of 
Certiorari, Google LLC v. Oracle America, Inc. (argued Oct. 7, 2020) (No. 18-956), 2019 WL 338902; Google LLC 
v. Oracle America, Inc., 140 S. Ct. 520 (2019). 
6 Oracle America, Inc. v. Google Inc., 750 F.3d 1339, 1347, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 
7 Brief Amici Curiae of 83 Computer Scientists in Support of Petitioner at 2-3, Google LLC v. Oracle America, Inc. 
(argued Oct. 7, 2020) (No. 18-956), 2020 WL 242506. 
8 Id. at 6. 
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on multiple operating systems.9 Before Java, programmers had to rewrite their programs for each different 
computer type.10  
The first issue that arose in the litigation between Oracle and Google was whether the declaring 
code and the overall structure, sequence, and organization of thirty-seven of Oracle’s API packages were 
copyrightable.11 The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California found that the API 
packages at issue were not subject to copyright protection.12 Thereafter, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Federal Circuit reversed the lower court’s decision concluding that the API packages were indeed subject 
to copyright protection. The appellate court remanded the case back to the district court to determine 
whether Google had a fair use defense under the Copyright Act.13 The remand led to a lengthy jury trial, 
and the district court entered judgment in favor of Google finding the company’s use of the copyrighted 
API material constituted fair use.14 On appeal, the Federal Circuit again reversed the district court’s 
judgment, this time finding that Google’s use was not fair as a matter of law.15 Google petitioned the U.S. 
Supreme Court, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari on November 15, 2019.16 The two issues 
presently pending in the Supreme Court are: (1) whether Java’s declaring code and the structure, 
sequence, and organization of the APIs are copyrightable, and (2) whether Google’s use of the declaring 
code and structure, sequence, and organization of the APIs constituted fair use, along with the Supreme 
Court’s sua sponte request regarding the appropriate standard of review on the fair use issue.17 
This article seeks to provide applicable principles, rules, statutes, and relevant case law relating to 
copyrights. Additionally, this article details the circuit court splits on what is protectable expression in 
 
9 Oracle America, Inc. v. Google Inc., 750 F.3d at 1348. 
10 Id. 
11 Oracle America, Inc. v. Google Inc., 750 F.3d at 1347. 
12 Oracle America, Inc. v. Google Inc., 872 F. Supp. 2d at 1002. 
13 Oracle America, Inc. v. Google Inc., 750 F.3d at 1347. 
14 Oracle America, Inc. v. Google LLC, 886 F.3d 1179, 1186 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 
15 Id. 
16 Petition for Writ of Certiorari at I, Google LLC v. Oracle America, Inc. (argued Oct. 7, 2020) (No. 18-956), 2019 
WL 338902; Google LLC v. Oracle America, Inc., 140 S. Ct. 520 (2019). 
17 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Google LLC v. Oracle America, Inc. (argued Oct. 7, 2020); Google LLC v. Oracle 
America, Inc., No. 18-956, 2020 U.S. LEXIS 2621 (May 4, 2020). 
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computer programs. This article further discusses the Federal Circuit’s Oracle America, Inc. v. Google 
Inc. and Oracle America Inc. v. Google LLC opinions, analyzing what the Federal Circuit got right in its 
judgment and what it got wrong. Finally, this article considers the likely approach and conclusions of the 
Supreme Court’s upcoming, long-awaited opinion. 
II. Background 
Copyrightability of Software Interfaces 
Concepts and Principles of Copyright Law 
The drafters of the United States Constitution gave Congress the power to enact laws to protect 
the “exclusive rights” of authors in their original works.18 Pursuant to the Copyright Act of 1976, original 
literary works of authorship, among others, receive copyright protection.19 When Congress enacted the 
Copyright Act of 1976, the legislative history explains that Congress included computer programs to the 
category of literary works, but only to the extent that the computer program incorporates the author’s 
original expression of the idea and not the idea itself.20 
Copyright law intends to protect an author’s creative, original expression of an idea but does not 
protect the underlying idea itself.21 As early as 1879, the Supreme Court conveyed the idea-expression 
dichotomy principle in Baker v. Selden.22 When enacting the Copyright Act of 1976, Congress codified 
the idea-expression dichotomy, stating that copyright protection in an original work of authorship does 
not “extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, 
regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work.”23 The 
 
18 See U.S. Const., art. I, §8. 
19 See 17 U.S.C. §102(a). 
20 H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 54 (1976), as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5667. 
21 Id. at 56-57. 
22 101 U.S. 99, 102-03, 107 (1879) (explaining that the copyright protects the author’s expression of how the 
accounting system is used but it does not protect others from using the accounting system as the author has 
explained it or from creating a book explaining the same accounting system). 
23 17 U.S.C. §102(b). 
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legislative history of the Copyright Act of 1976 reflects concerns relating to the extent of copyright 
protection in computer programs. Congress attempted to address these concerns by explaining that a 
programmer’s expression is the copyrightable element of the computer program, and the “actual process 
or methods embodied in the program” are not copyrightable.24 
Sometimes, an author’s original expression is not divisible from the idea. Pursuant to the merger 
doctrine, an idea and the idea’s expression merge when there are one or very few ways of expressing the 
idea.25 In a Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals case, a gas pipeline company brought a copyright infringement 
suit against a competitor, alleging that the competitor copied its proposed route of a natural gas pipeline 
as depicted on a map that the company created.26 The appellate court agreed with the district court’s 
holding that “the idea of the location of the pipeline” and its expression of that pipeline on a map are 
inseparable and that the map expressed “the only effective way the idea of the location of the pipeline.”27 
Thus, the route of the proposed pipeline was not copyrightable because the idea and expression merged.28 
To determine whether an idea and expression have merged, courts must look at whether there are multiple 
ways to express the idea in question.29 If a court determines that the idea and the expression of the idea 
are indivisible, then the merger doctrine is applicable, and the expression of that idea is not protectable by 
copyright.30  
Another important concept in copyright law relates to the copyrightability of compilations.31 An 
author’s work must be original to receive copyright protection.32 Facts are not original, and therefore, not 
copyrightable.33 Although factual compilations may include some originality, that originality does not 
 
24 H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 57 (1976), as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5670. 
25 Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1253 (3d Cir. 1983). 
26 Kern River Gas Transmission Co. v. Coastal Corp., 899 F.2d 1458, 1461 (5th Cir. 1990). 
27 Id. at 1363-64. 
28 Id. 
29 Mason v. Montgomery Data, Inc., 967 F.2d 135, 138-39 (5th Cir. 1992). 
30 Id. at 139. 
31 The Copyright Act defines a compilation as “a work formed by the collection and assembling of preexisting 
materials or of data that are selected, coordinated, or arranged in such a way that the resulting work as a whole 
constitutes an original work of authorship.” 17 U.S.C. §101. 
32 Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991). 
33 Id. at 347. 
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extend to the facts, but rather the author’s selection and arrangement of those facts, so long as the author 
independently chose the selection and arrangement of the facts and the selection and arrangement involve 
a “minimal degree of creativity.”34  Only the author’s selection or arrangement is considered original and 
protectable by copyright law.35 In Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., a telephone 
utility company brought a copyright infringement action against a publisher of telephone directories, 
alleging that the publisher copied the utility company’s white page listings from its telephone directory.36 
The utility company asserted that the sweat of the brow doctrine37 applied, which meant that, instead of 
the publisher copying the listings from the utility company’s telephone directory, the publisher was 
required to go door-to-door to obtain that information.38 The Supreme Court rejected the sweat of the 
brow approach to copyright protection, stating that “originality, not ‘sweat of the brow,’ is the touchstone 
of copyright protection in directories and other fact-based works.”39 Thereafter, the Supreme Court 
concluded that the information provided in the telephone utility company’s telephone directory was 
uncopyrightable facts.40 Finally, the Court determined that the telephone directory lacked originality in 
the coordination and arrangement of those facts, that the arrangement of names in alphabetical order 
lacked any degree of creativity, and that such an arrangement is commonplace in telephone directories.41 
U.S. Circuit Court Approaches to Determine What is Protectable Expression in Computer Programs 
The United States Courts of Appeals do not uniformly agree on how to determine what is 
protectable expression in computer programs.  The U.S. Courts of Appeals for the First and Sixth 
Circuits’ view is that 17 U.S.C. §102(b)42 precludes copyright protection of expression since the 
 
34 Id. at 348. 
35 Id. at 350. 
36 Id. at 344. 
37 The underlying notion of the sweat of the brow doctrine “was that copyright was a reward for the hard work that 
went into compiling facts.” Id. at 352.  
38 Id. at 344. 
39 Id. at 359-60. 
40 Id. at 361. 
41 Id. at 362-63. 
42 Section 102(b) states, “[i]n no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend to any 
idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in 
which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work.” 17 U.S.C. §102(b). 
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expression is contained in forms that are not copyrightable, such as procedures, processes, or methods of 
operation.43 Meanwhile, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit’s view is that 17 U.S.C. §102(b) 
does not preclude copyright protection so long as there are multiple ways to express the idea.44 Finally, 
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit takes an entirely different approach by applying an 
abstraction-filtration-comparison test.45 
In the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit’s case, Lotus Development Corp. v. Borland 
International, Inc., the parties disputed whether Lotus’s menu command hierarchy was copyrightable.46 
The lower court initially took a similar approach to the Third Circuit’s approach, concluding that because 
the Lotus developers had a variety of choices on how to structure the menu command hierarchy and a 
choice of words to use in the menu, consequently the menu command hierarchy constituted copyrightable 
expression.47 However, the First Circuit focused not on whether the copied material was expression, but 
whether it was protectable under 17 U.S.C. §102(b).48 In doing so, the court rejected the Second Circuit’s 
abstraction-filtration-comparison test, concluding that, since the test only applies to nonliteral copying, 
the test would be of little assistance with the instant issue of literal copying.49 The court concluded that 
the menu command hierarchy was a method of operation and, thus, uncopyrightable.50 After the First 
Circuit’s ruling, Lotus petitioned for certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court. The High Court granted 
certiorari, and an equally divided Court affirmed the First Circuit’s judgment.51 
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit came to a similar conclusion as the First Circuit 
in Lexmark International, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc. Similar to Lotus, Lexmark dealt with 
 
43 See Lotus Development Corp. v. Borland International, Inc., 49 F.3d 807 (1st Cir. 1995) aff’d, 516 U.S. 233 
(1996); Lexmark International, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 387 F.3d 522 (6th Cir. 2004). 
44 See Whelan Associates, Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, Inc., 797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1986). 
45 See Computer Associates International, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1992). 
46 49 F.3d 807, 809 (1st Cir. 1995) aff’d, 516 U.S. 233 (1996). 
47 Id. at 811. 
48 See Id. at 815. 
49 Id. at 814-15. 
50 Id. at 815. 
51 See Lotus Development Corp. v. Borland International, Inc., 516 U.S. 233 (1996). 
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the literal copying of aspects of a computer program, specifically an exact copy of Lexmark’s Toner 
Loading Program.52 Also similar to Lotus, the lower court in Lexmark deemed the program copyrightable 
because a programmer could write it in various ways.53 The Sixth Circuit discussed the two-prong test for 
analyzing a copyright infringement claim.54 The first prong, which looks at the ownership of a valid 
copyright, “tests the originality and non-functionality of the work.”55 In the second prong, a court asks 
whether the defendant copied protectable elements of the work; this prong tests whether copying occurred 
and if so, whether the copied portions were protectable under copyright.56 The appellate court determined 
that the lower court erred in its reasoning under the second prong and explained that to determine if 
originality exists, a “court should ask whether the ideas, methods of operation and facts of the program 
could have been expressed in any form other than that chosen by the programmer, taking into 
consideration the functionality, compatibility and efficiency demanded of the program.”57 The court’s 
determination implied that expression falling under any of the categories in 17 U.S.C. §102(b) precludes 
copyright protection.58 
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit takes a contrary approach from the First and 
Sixth Circuits. In Whelan Associates, Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, Inc., a dispute arose about the 
similarities between the structure and organization of two programs used in dental laboratories.59 
However, the code in the programs was not the same.60 The lower court determined that the defendant did 
not create his program independently, that he had access to the plaintiff’s program, and that the two 
programs were substantially similar to one another, concluding that the defendant infringed on the 
plaintiff’s copyright.61 The court set out to determine whether the structure of a program was 
 
52 387 F.3d 522, 530-31 (6th Cir. 2004). 
53 Id. at 531. 
54 Id. at 534. 
55 Id. 
56 Id. 
57 Id. at 539. 
58 See Id. 
59 797 F.2d 1222, 1228-29 (3d Cir. 1986). 
60 Id. at 1233. 
61 Id. 
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copyrightable.62 In answering that question, the court used the Baker v. Selden reasoning to conclude that 
“the purpose or function of a utilitarian work would be the work’s idea, and everything that is not 
necessary to that purpose or function would be part of the expression of the idea.”63 The court further 
explained its conclusion by stating, “[w]here there are various means of achieving the desired purpose, 
then the particular means chosen is not necessary to the purpose; hence, there is expression, not idea.”64 
The court proceeded to apply the rule it created, which the court stated has its “greatest force in the 
analysis of utilitarian or ‘functional’ works,” to conclude that the structure of the program was part of the 
programmer’s expression and was not the programmer’s idea of the program.65 
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit takes an entirely different approach from the 
First, Sixth, and Third Circuits. In Computer Associates International, Inc. v. Altai, Inc.,  the plaintiff 
initially sued the defendant for literal copying of the code of the plaintiff’s program, ADAPTER, in the 
defendant’s program OSCAR 3.4.66 The defendant did not learn of the code copying until receiving the 
plaintiff’s complaint, but one of the defendant’s employees, who was a former employee of the plaintiff, 
confirmed the copying as true.67 The defendant then rewrote its OSCAR 3.4 program to exclude any 
portion of the code copied from ADAPTER.68 The rewritten OSCAR 3.4, named OSCAR 3.5, then 
sparked the plaintiff to file a separate, new copyright infringement claim arising from non-literal elements 
of ADAPTER that the OSCAR 3.5 program purportedly took.69 The lower court found that OSCAR 3.5’s 
structure, including its non-literal elements, was not substantially similar to ADAPTER.70 The plaintiff 
appealed the decision, claiming that the lower court failed to find that copyright protects the expression in 
non-literal elements of a computer program.71 The appellate court began with a lengthy analysis of 
 
62 Id. at 1234. 
63 Id. at 1236. 
64 Id. 
65 Id. at 1238-39. 
66 982 F.2d 693, 700 (2d Cir. 1992). 
67 Id. 
68 Id. 
69 Id. at 701. 
70 Id. at 696-97. 
71 Id. at 702. 
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copyright law, including Baker v. Selden.72 From its analysis, the court concluded that “elements of a 
computer program that are necessarily incidental to its function are . . . unprotectable.”73 From there, the 
court formulated its abstraction-filtration-comparison test to determine how to separate an idea in a 
computer program from its expression.74 In the first step of the test, “abstraction,” a court is to dissect the 
plaintiff’s copyrighted work’s structure and “isolate each level of abstraction contained within it,” starting 
with the code and ending with “an articulation of the program’s ultimate function.”75 The second step,  
“filtration,” separates the protectable expression from any non-protectable elements by examining the 
levels of abstraction “to determine whether their particular inclusion at that level was ‘idea’ or was 
dictated by considerations of efficiency, so as to be necessarily incidental to that idea; required by factors 
external to the program itself; or taken from the public domain and hence is nonprotectable expression.”76 
The court elaborated that oftentimes, a programmer’s choice in design is made by external factors such 
as: 
(1) the mechanical specification of the computer on which a particular program is 
intended to run; (2) compatibility requirements of other programs with which a program 
is designed to operate in conjunction; (3) computer manufacturers’ design standards; (4) 
demands of the industry being served; and (5) widely accepted programming practices 
within the computer industry.77 
 
The third and final step in the test is “comparison.”78 In the comparison step, after the court has filtered 
out all nonprotectable elements in the program, the court compares the remaining protectable expression 
in the plaintiff’s copyrighted program to the defendant’s alleged infringing program for substantial 
similarity.79 
 
72 Id. at 702-05. 
73 Id. at 705. 
74 Id. at 706. 
75 Id. at 707. 
76 Id. 
77 Id. at 709-10. 
78 Id. at 710. 
79 Id. at 710-11. 
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 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit appears to have endorsed the Second Circuit’s 
abstraction-filtration-comparison test as the proper approach.80 In the court’s fair use analysis, it criticized 
the Third Circuit’s approach in Whelan as being “simplistic and overbroad,” pointing out that a program 
is an intricate set of subroutines, which are in themselves programs, and each subroutine has its own idea, 
making the Whelan approach inadequate.81 The court then analyzed the Second Circuit’s approach, 
concluding that “in light of the essentially utilitarian nature of computer programs, the Second Circuit’s 
approach is an appropriate one.”82 
The Fair Use Doctrine 
Although copyright holders have exclusive rights to their original expression, there are limitations 
to their exclusive rights.83 One of those limitations is fair use.84 According to 17 U.S.C. §107, if the use of 
a copyrighted work is fair, then using the copyrighted work is not infringement. The statute also provides 
a non-comprehensive list of purposes in which the use could be deemed fair: “for purposes such as 
criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching . . . , scholarship, or research.”85 The statute also provides 
courts with four factors that they must include when determining whether the use was fair:  
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial 
nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; 
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work; 
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work 
as a whole; and 
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.86 
 
 
80 See Sega Enterprises Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1992). 
81 Id. at 1524-25. 
82 Id. at 1525. 









As the statute’s use of the term “shall include” indicates, and as the legislative history explains, courts can 
consider other relevant factors besides the four that the statute lists when determining fair use.87 The 
legislative history further explains that codifying the defense of fair use to copyright infringement claims 
was not intended to limit the scope of the judicial doctrine of fair use, which is where the doctrine 
originated, nor to “change, narrow, or enlarge it in any way.”88 
Factor One: The Purpose and Character of the Use 
The first factor in a court’s fair use analysis is the purpose and character of the use.89 In 1984, the 
U.S. Supreme Court concluded that if the copied material is for a commercial or profit-making purpose, 
then the use would presumptively be unfair.90 The following year, the Supreme Court solidified the 
presumption and again stated that “[t]he fact that a publication was commercial as opposed to nonprofit is 
a separate factor that tends to weigh against a finding of fair use.”91 The Court elaborated on the 
presumption by explaining that the commercial purpose should focus on whether the copier will profit 
from exploiting the copyrighted material without paying the established price instead of the motive being 
solely for monetary gain.92 Then, in 1994, the Supreme Court seemed to draw back on their presumption 
that works of a commercial purpose are presumptively unfair.93 Furthermore, the Court stated that 
commercial or nonprofit purpose is only one of the elements in the first-factor inquiry of fair use and that 
if the factor hinged on that one element, then many of the purposes in the statute would fail as they tend to 
be done for a profit.94 The Court’s factor one inquiry focused more on whether the copying work was 
transformative from the original.95 A transformative work does not supplant the original, but rather “adds 
something new, with a further purpose or different character, altering the first with new expression, 
 
87 H.R. Rep. No. 102-836, at 1 (1992), as reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2553, 2553. 
88 H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 66 (1976), as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5680. 
89 17 U.S.C. §107(1). 
90 Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 448-49 (1984). 
91 Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, 562 (1985.) 
92 Id.  
93 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 583-84 (1994). 
94 Id. at 584. 
95 Id. at 578-83. 
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meaning, or message.”96 The Court also noted that finding that a work is not transformative does not 
always go against a finding of fair use.97 In the Campbell case, the Court found that although a parody has 
a commercial purpose, the work was transformative, which pulled the first factor more toward a finding 
of fair use.98 
Factor Two: The Nature of the Copyrighted Work 
The second factor in a fair use analysis is the nature of the copyrighted work.99 “This factor calls 
for recognition that some works are closer to the core of intended copyright protection than others, with 
the consequence that fair use is more difficult to establish when the former works are copied.”100 This 
means that the more creative an author’s original expression, like a fictional novel, the stronger the 
copyright protection, and the less creative, like a factual compilation, the “thinner” the copyright 
protection.101 In the Court’s analysis of the second factor in Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc., it appears 
that instead of looking at the nature of the copyrighted work as a whole, the Court focused on the 
particular parts of the work copied and weighed the expressive elements taken against the facts taken, in 
which the Court concluded that the use of the expressive elements went beyond what was necessary to 
convey the facts.102 
 
 
Factor Three: The Amount and Substantiality of the Portion Used 
 
96 Id. at 579. 
97 Id. 
98 Id. at 578-85, 594. 
99 17 U.S.C. §107(2). 
100 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 586. 
101 See Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 237-38 (1990); Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., 499 
U.S. 340, 349 (1991). 
102 Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, 563-63 (1985). 
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The third factor in a fair use analysis is the amount and substantiality of the portion used in 
relation to the copyrighted work as a whole.103 The analysis looks at the quantity of the plaintiff’s 
copyrighted work that the defendant’s work used in relation to the whole of the plaintiff’s copyrighted 
work.104 The analysis also looks at the quality of the plaintiff’s work that the defendant’s work used.105 
The Supreme Court stated that a relevant question to this analysis is whether the defendant copied “a 
substantial portion” of the defendant’s work exactly from the plaintiff’s original work.106 If the defendant 
did copy a substantial portion from the plaintiff’s original work, it could indicate that the defendant’s 
work is more likely to take the place of the use and demand for the plaintiff’s original work.107 However, 
a court could still find fair use even when a defendant copies the entire work.108 Furthermore, the third 
factor may not weigh against the defendant, so long as the defendant takes no more than what is necessary 
for use in the defendant’s work.109 The third-factor analysis uses as a qualitative element the importance 
of the material copied from the original work.110 In Harper & Row, the Supreme Court agreed with the 
district court’s evaluation of the copied work’s qualitative character from the original.111 The Supreme 
Court found that the copied work used “what was essentially the heart of the book,” even though the 
portion in the copied work was a quantitatively insubstantial portion of the original work.112 
Factor Four: Market and Value Effects  
The fourth factor in a fair use analysis is the effect of the use upon the potential market for the 
copyrighted work or the effect on the value of the copyrighted work.113 In analyzing the fourth factor, a 
court must look at the extent of the market harm that the copied work produced and whether the copier’s 
 
103 17 U.S.C. §107(3). 
104 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 587. 
105 See Id.; Seltzer v. Green Day, Inc., 725 F.3d 1170, 1178 (9th Cir. 2013). 
106 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 587-88. 
107 Id. at 587-88. 
108 Sega Enterprises Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1526 (9th Cir. 1992). 
109 Seltzer, 725 F.3d at 1178. 
110 Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, 564-65 (1985). 
111 Id. 
112 Id. 
113 17 U.S.C. §107(4). 
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conduct in copying the original would impact the potential market for the original work.114 The analysis 
must also take into account the market harm for derivative works.115 According to the Supreme Court, the 
market for potential derivative uses of the original “includes only those that creators of original works in 
general develop or license others to develop.”116 Additionally, transformative uses weigh into the fourth-
factor analysis because when a work is transformative, market substitution for the original work is less 
certain, and market harm may be less apparent.117 According to the Second Circuit, courts should balance 
the fourth factor between the public’s benefit if the use is allowed and the “personal gain the copyright 
owner will receive if the use denied.”118 Furthermore, the Second Circuit succinctly noted that “were a 
court automatically to conclude in every case that potential licensing revenues were impermissibly 
impaired simply because the secondary user did not pay a fee for the right to engage in the use, the fourth 
fair use factor would always favor the copyright holder.”119 
Standard of Review for the Fair Use Doctrine 
“Fair use is a mixed question of law and fact,” which an appellate court may decide if the lower 
court has found facts sufficient to evaluate the fair use factors.120 Mixed questions differ from one 
another.121 The Supreme Court has elaborated that when an issue happens to be somewhere between a 
legal standard and a fact, then the standard of review “often reflects which ‘judicial actor is better 
positioned’ to make the decision.”122 When it is necessary to expand on a legal standard in a mixed 
question, appellate courts should conduct a de novo review123 of the lower court’s decision.124 However, 
 
114 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 590 (1994). 
115 Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 568. 
116 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 592. 
117 Id. at 591. 
118 Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling Kindersley Ltd., 448 F.3d 605, 613 (2d Cir. 2006). 
119 Id. at 614. 
120 Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 560. 
121 U.S. Bank National Ass’n (ex rel. CWCapital Asset Management LLC) v. Village at Lakeridge, LLC, 138 S. Ct. 
960, 967 (2018). 
122 Id. 
123 De novo review is when an “appellate court uses the trial court’s record but reviews the evidence and law without 
deference to the trial court’s rulings.” Appeal, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). 
124 U.S. Bank National Ass’n, 138 S. Ct. at 967. 
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an appellate court should review the lower court’s decision with deference125 when the mixed question 
pertains to case-specific factual issues that require the lower court to weigh the evidence and “make 
credibility judgments.”126 Furthermore, the Supreme Court has stated that when a “district court has found 
facts sufficient to evaluate each of the statutory factors,” then it is not necessary for an appellate court to 
remand for further factfinding, and the appellate court may conclude as a matter of law whether the 
copied work qualifies as fair use of the copyrighted work.127 Additionally, the Ninth Circuit has 
concluded that when a record is sufficient to evaluate each fair use factor, then the appellate court “may 
reweigh on appeal the inferences to be drawn from that record.”128 
Oracle America, Inc. v. Google LLC 
Background and Facts 
 After developing the Java platform, Sun Microsystems, Inc. (“Sun”) released it in 1996.129 Oracle 
America, Inc. (“Oracle”) purchased Sun in 2010.130 Before Java, computer programmers had to write 
different versions of the programs they created to run on different operating systems, such as Windows 
and macOS.131 Java alleviated computer programmers’ burden by allowing them to create a program that 
runs on all the different types of computers, through the Java platform, without rewriting the code for 
each operating system.132 Java’s motto is “write once, run anywhere.”133  
 
125 Deferential review is “[a]n appellate standard granting relief from a lower court’s. . . judgment only when earlier 
proceeding entailed an unreasonable application of clearly established law or a clearly unreasonable determination 
of the facts.” Review, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). 
126 U.S. Bank National Ass’n, 138 S. Ct. at 967. 
127 Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 560. 
128 Mattel, Inc. v. Walking Mountain Productions, 353 F.3d 792, 800 (9th Cir. 2003). 
129 Oracle America, Inc. v. Google Inc., 750 F.3d 1339, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 
130 Oracle America, Inc. v. Google LLC, 886 F.3d 1179, 1186 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 
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Sun created the Java language to write programs on the Java platform.134 The Java language, like 
other programming languages, is a written language that is “human-readable.”135 However, the human-
readable code, called “source code,” is not readable by computer hardware.136 Computers instead read 
what is called “object code,” which is most commonly written in a binary language consisting of only 1s 
and 0s.137 Thus, for a computer to read a computer program’s source code, it must be converted into 
object code.138 
Java 2 Standard Edition, commonly referred to as “Java SE,” is the name of the Java platform at 
issue, which includes, among other things, the Java Application Programming Interface (“API”).139 “The 
Java API is a collection of ‘pre-written Java source code programs for common and more advanced 
computer functions.’”140 The APIs allow computer programmers to use the pre-written code to perform 
common functions without writing the code from scratch; they are shortcuts that computer programmers 
can use when writing a program.141 The pre-written codes are organized into groups called “packages.”142 
Each package contains “methods,” which are the pre-written code for a specific function.143 The methods 
within a package are sorted into “classes,” the classes group similar methods together.144 Likewise, the 
packages group related classes together.145 A good analogy of the organization is: “Oracle’s collection of 
API packages is like a library, each package is like a bookshelf in the library, each class is like a book on 
 





139 Oracle America, Inc. v. Google LLC, 886 F.3d 1179, 1186 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 
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142 Oracle America, Inc v. Google Inc., 750 F.3d 1339, 1348-49 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 
143 Id. at 1349. 








the shelf, and each method is like a how-to chapter in a book.”146 The Java platform contains more than 
6,000 methods that are sorted into over 600 classes that are grouped into 166 API packages.147 
 Packages contain two types of source code: the declaring code and the implementing code.148 
Computer programmers use a “call” to conjure the associated method.149 The call is connected to the 
method by the declaring code.150 If a call is not written exactly as required, it will not pull up the 
corresponding declaration, and thus, not work.151 The declaring code (the “declaration” or the “header”) is 
“the expression that identifies the prewritten function,” and it “introduces the method body and specifics 
very precisely the inputs, name and other functionality.”152 The declaring code directs the computer to 
execute the implementing code associated with the specific declaring code.153 The implementing code is 
the instructions to the computer to execute a specific function.154 Implementing code can be written in 
various ways, unlike the declaring code.155 
 Oracle owns copyrights in Java SE, including in the API packages.156 However, the Java language 
itself is free to use without permission.157 For a programmer to write using the Java language, the 
programmer must use “62 classes (and some of their methods), spread across three packages within the 
Java library.”158 Without the use of the sixty-two classes, the Java language will not work.159 Besides 
using the sixty-two classes, programmers can write their own prewritten code packages to perform 
various functions.160 Oracle offers three different licenses on its copyrighted material: a General Public 
 
146 Oracle America, Inc. v. Google Inc., 750 F.3d at 1349. 
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149 Brief for the Petitioner at 3, Google LLC v. Oracle America, Inc. (argued Oct. 7, 2020) (No. 18-956), 2020 WL 
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License, a Specification License, and a Commercial License.161 The General Public License is an open-
source license that allows programmers to use the declaring and implementing codes for free.162 However, 
the programmer must give back to the public any innovations the programmer makes to the code.163 The 
Specification License allows the licensee to use the declaring code and the structure of the API packages, 
but the licensee must write the implementing code.164 Finally, the Commercial License allows businesses, 
in exchange for royalties, to use all of the copyrighted material while keeping any code the business 
creates secret.165 Both the Specification and Commercial Licenses require that any programs created with 
the license be compatible with the Java platform.166 
 In 2005, Google and Sun began negotiations to license the use of the Java platform to create 
Google’s mobile platform, Android.167 The negotiations failed “because Google wanted device 
manufacturers to be able to use Oracle’s APIs in Android for free with no limits on modifying the code, 
which would jeopardize the ‘write once, run anywhere’ philosophy.”168 Google nevertheless decided to 
use Java when creating its Android platform.169 In doing so, Google copied the declaring code of thirty-
seven API packages, which equates to 11,500 lines of copyrighted code, and the structure, sequence, and 
organization of the API packages.170 When comparing Java’s thirty-seven API packages, including the 
declaring and implementing code, to Google’s thirty-seven API packages, the code that Google copied 
constitutes only three percent of the total code in Java’s thirty-seven API packages.171 Google’s Android 
platform contains 168 API packages, which includes the thirty-seven copied packages.172 Google used the 
specific thirty-seven API packages because it assumed that “programmers would want to find the same 37 
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sets of functionalities in the new Android system callable by the same names as used in Java.”173 
Google’s use of the thirty-seven sets allowed Android to be, in a way, interoperable with Java, meaning 
that programmers could use their knowledge of the Java calls to write programs both for desktops, which 
the Java platform runs on, and smartphones, which the Android platform runs on.174 Even though Google 
used the Java language to write Android, Android is not compatible with the Java platform, which implies 
that applications and programs that a programmer writes for Android will not run on Java and vice 
versa.175 
By using the thirty-seven API packages, Google “reimplemented” Java’s interfaces.176 
Reimplementation is “[t]he process of writing new software to perform certain functions of a legacy 
product.”177 Free reimplementation of software interfaces is a long-standing practice that is important for 
“innovation and competition in software.”178 When a programmer reimplements an interface, it must 
maintain the structure, sequence, and organization of the interface.179 Otherwise, the interface would be 
incompatible and not interoperable.180  
 In 2008, phones with the Android platform began selling to consumers.181 Since their release, 
Android smartphones have grown in popularity and comprise “a large share of the United States 
market.”182 The Android platform is free for manufactures.183 Instead of charging manufacturers to use the 
Android platform, Google generates revenue through advertising.184 The release of the free Android 
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platform affected Oracle’s licensing.185 Amazon had initially licensed Java for its Kindle tablet, but then 
switched to Android when it released another generation of its Kindle tablet, and thereafter, Amazon 
leveraged Android against Oracle to get a large discount to use the Java platform again.186 
Litigation Between Oracle America and Google in the Federal District and Circuit Courts 
 In 2010, a few months after Oracle acquired Sun, Oracle filed a suit against Google in the United 
States District Court for the Northern District of California, asserting seven claims of patent infringement 
and one claim of copyright infringement.187 Oracle withdrew five of the seven patent infringement claims, 
and the remaining two claims went to a jury who ultimately found against Oracle.188 Oracle’s copyright 
claim asserted that Google copied Java API declarations, along with the structure, sequence, and 
organization of the API.189  
 The district court conducted a two-week trial.190 The trial occurred in two phases.191 The first 
phase was on copyrightability, copyright infringement, and equitable defenses.192 The second phase was 
on patent infringement.193 For phase one, the parties agreed that the Judge would decide the issues of 
copyrightability and equitable defenses asserted by Google, and the jury would decide the issues of 
copyright infringement and fair use.194  
The jury received instructions to consider that the structure, sequence, and organization of the 
API packages at issue were copyrightable.195 While that was not the actual legal conclusion, the 
 
185 Id. at 1188. 
186 Id. 
187 Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 7, Google LLC v. Oracle America, Inc. (argued Oct. 7, 2020) (No. 18-956), 2019 
WL 338902. 
188 Id. at 7-8 
189 Id. at 8. 
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instruction intended to prevent an expensive retrial if the case underwent an appeal and reversal.196 
Instead, the appellate court could simply reinstate the jury verdict.197 The jury returned a verdict in favor 
of Oracle, finding that “Google infringed Oracle’s copyrights in the 37 Java packages,” but the jury was 
“deadlocked on Google’s fair use defense.”198 Oracle then filed a motion for judgment as a matter of law 
on the issue of fair use, which the district court denied.199 Afterward, the district court issued a 
preliminary decision, finding that the copied material in the thirty-seven API packages, which included 
the declaring code and the structure, sequence, and organization, were not copyrightable because they 
were a method of operation, and as such, are not copyrightable elements under 17 U.S.C. §102(b).200 The 
district court also found that there was only one way to write the declaring code, and therefore, the merger 
doctrine applied, which barred copyright ownership to the expression.201 Furthermore, the district court 
“found that the declaring code was not protectable because ‘names and short phrases cannot be 
copyrighted.’”202 Thereafter, the district court entered final judgment in favor of Google on the copyright 
infringement claims relating to the thirty-seven API packages.203 Oracle then appealed the rulings that the 
court entered against it in the final judgment, and Google cross-appealed the rulings the court entered 
against it in the final judgment.204 
The appeal went to the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit because the suit 
included patent claims and the Federal Circuit has jurisdiction over any suit that includes patent claims.205 
The Federal Circuit, however, applied Ninth Circuit law to the appeal because, “’[w]hen the questions on 
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197 Id. at 975-76. 
198 Oracle America, Inc. v. Google Inc., 750 F.3d 1339, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 
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appeal involve law and precedent on subjects not exclusively assigned to the Federal Circuit, the court 
applies the law which would be applied by the regional circuit.’”206  
The Federal Circuit first looked at whether the declaring code was entitled to copyright protection 
under the merger doctrine and short phrases doctrine.207 The appellate court concluded that the merger 
doctrine does not apply because there were alternative expressions available to Oracle when Oracle 
created the code.208 Further, the appellate court stated that the district court failed to ask the correct 
question regarding the doctrine of short phrases.209 “The question is not whether a short phrase or a series 
of short phrases can be extracted from the work, but whether the manner in which they are used or strung 
together exhibits creativity.”210 The appellate court reasoned that the declaring codes are not specific 
words or short phrases but are instead, 7,000 lines of declaring code, and the declaring codes expressed 
creativity in the selection and arrangement of the declarations.211 The appellate court then concluded that 
the district court erred in applying the short phrases doctrine to find that the declaring codes are not 
protectable under copyright law.212 
The appellate court then reviewed the district court’s finding that the structure, sequence, and 
organization of the Java API packages are not copyrightable because they are a method of operation, 
which cannot be copyrighted under 17 U.S.C. §102(b), even if the API packages are creative and 
original.213 The appellate court stated that the district court’s reasoning was not based on Ninth Circuit 
law but, instead, on First Circuit law that the Ninth Circuit had not adopted.214 The appellate court then 
provided the correct Ninth Circuit law, which states that “the structure, sequence, and organization of a 
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computer program is eligible for copyright protection where it qualifies as an expression of an idea, rather 
than the idea itself.”215 Applying Ninth Circuit law, the appellate court found that the structure, sequence, 
and organization was creative and original and that the declaring code could have been written in a 
variety of ways while still achieving the same functions.216 Therefore, the court concluded that 17 U.S.C. 
§102(b) does not bar copyright protection on the code.217 
Finally, Oracle argued on appeal that the appellate court should find Google’s use of the 
copyrighted material not to be fair use as a matter of law.218 The appellate court found that neither the 
lower court nor the jury had made findings of fact that would allow the appellate court to assess the 
question of whether Google’s use of the API packages was fair.219 Namely, the appellate court found that 
there were disputed facts of whether Google’s use of the copyrighted work was transformative, whether 
Google’s desire to make the Android platform interoperable weighs into the fair use factors, and whether 
the release of Android harmed Java’s market.220 The appellate court remanded the proceedings to the 
district court for further proceedings to determine Google’s fair use defense.221 
After the Federal Circuit’s opinion, Google petitioned for certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court on 
the copyrightability issue.222 The Supreme Court ultimately denied certiorari.223 
 Upon remand to the district court, the court had a second jury trial on the issue of fair use.224 The 
jury returned a verdict in favor of Google on its fair use defense.225 Thereafter, Oracle filed a motion for 
judgment as a matter of law, which the district court denied and entered final judgment in favor of 
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Google.226 Oracle then filed a renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law and a motion for a new 
trial.227 The district court denied both motions, and Oracle appealed the denial along with the final 
judgment and prior denial of its motion for judgment as a matter of law.228 Google also cross-appealed to 
preserve its claim as to copyrightability that the prior Federal Circuit opinion decided.229 
 Again, the appeal went to the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.230 On appeal, 
Oracle argued that all four of the statutory fair use factors weighed against a finding of fair use, namely 
that: (1) Google’s use was solely commercial, (2) the nature of the copyrighted work is highly creative, 
(3) Google copied more than what was necessary to write in the Java language, and (4) Android harmed 
Oracle since Oracle’s customers stopped licensing Java and switched to the Android platform.231 The 
appellate court first looked at the standard of review for the issue of fair use and concluded: 
whether the court applied the correct legal standard to the fair use inquiry is a question 
[the appellate court] review[s] de novo, whether the findings relating to any relevant 
historical facts were correct are questions which [the appellate court] review[s] with 
deference, and whether the use at issue is ultimately a fair one is something [the appellate 
court] also review[s] de novo.232 
 
The appellate court proceeded to state that, besides the jury’s implied findings of historical fact, all the 
jury’s other findings relating to fair use are advisory.233 
 Thereafter, the appellate court applied the four fair use factors.234 The appellate court found that 
the first-factor analysis of the purpose and character of Google’s use of the API packages was 
“overwhelmingly commercial” and that Google’s use was not transformative, concluding that both of 
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those factors weighed against a finding of fair use.235 The appellate court also reviewed the jury’s implied 
finding that Google’s use was not in bad faith for the first-factor analysis, and found that the factor does 
not weigh in Google’s favor, only a finding of bad faith would weigh against Google.236 As to factor two, 
the nature of the copyrighted work, the appellate court found that “reasonable jurors could have 
concluded that functional considerations [of the declarations and structure, sequence, and organization of 
the API packages] were both substantial and important,” and concluded that factor two weighed in favor 
of a finding of fair use.237 The factor three analysis on the amount and substantiality of the portion used, 
the appellate court found that even if the jury found that Google copied only a small fraction of Java SE, a 
reasonable jury could not find that “what was copied was qualitatively insignificant,” and the court 
concluded that the third factor is at best neutral to a finding of fair use, but that it could also weigh against 
a finding of fair use.238 Finally, in the fourth-factor analysis, the appellate court found evidence of actual 
market harm, which no reasonable jury could have concluded otherwise, and that there was potential 
market harm for derivative works.239 The appellate court, therefore, concluded that the fourth factor 
weighed against a finding of fair use.240 Thereafter, the appellate court weighed all four factors and 
concluded that Google’s use of the copyrighted material was not fair as a matter of law and remanded the 
proceeding for a trial to determine the amount of damages.241 
 After the Federal Circuit found against Google’s fair use defense, Google petitioned the Supreme 
Court for a writ of certiorari.242 The Supreme Court granted certiorari on November 15, 2019, and the 
Supreme Court heard oral arguments on October 7, 2020.243 
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What the Federal Circuit Likely Got Right  
 Although the U.S. Supreme Court will likely find that the Federal Circuit misinterpreted some 
case law and misconstrued some of the facts to reach legal conclusions, the U.S. Supreme Court will 
likely find that the Federal Circuit was correct on some of its conclusions. The Federal Circuit’s holding 
that Java’s declaring code and the structure, sequence, and organization of the APIs were copyrightable 
was likely the correct conclusion, at least as to some aspects they are copyrightable. The Federal Circuit 
appears to give the structure, sequence, and organization of the APIs full copyright protection, but it 
should only be entitled to a thin copyright. The structure, sequence, and organization of the APIs are 
similar to the selection and arrangement of the telephone directory in Feist Publications, Inc v. Rural 
Telephone Service Co.244 In both the telephone directory and the structure, sequence, and organization of 
the APIs, the creator decided how to organize the information.245 However, in the case of the telephone 
directory, the organizational scheme of the directory was in no way original and was commonplace, 
whereas the organizational scheme of the Java APIs was original, and others creating a similar 
organizational scheme would likely structure it differently. The Federal Circuit likely overemphasized the 
creativeness in designing the structure, sequence, and organization of the APIs. On the other hand, the 
declaring code is far more creative than the APIs organizational scheme, and thus, likely deserves more 
than a thin copyright as to any of the declaring code’s non-functional elements. As stated by the Federal 
Circuit, Oracle had an unlimited amount of options when creating its declaring code; for example, instead 
of using the word “max” in its code, it could have used the word “larger” or “greater.”246 
 The U.S. Supreme Court will likely find that the Federal Circuit was also correct to apply the 
Second Circuit’s “abstraction-filtration-comparison” test to the copyrightability of the declaring code and 
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the structure, sequence, and organization of the APIs. The Federal Circuit stated that the District Court 
failed to apply the abstraction-filtration-comparison test to the copyrightability question, but the Federal 
Circuit itself failed to go through the analysis.247 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
endorsed the abstraction-filtration-comparison test as the proper approach, and because the Federal 
Circuit is required to apply Ninth Circuit law in the case at hand, the Federal Circuit should have 
performed the test’s lengthy analysis.248 Because the Federal Circuit failed to properly analyze the copied 
material at issue under the abstraction-filtration-comparison test, the Federal Circuit may have allowed 
aspects of the declaring code and structure, sequence, and organization of the APIs to be deemed 
protected under copyright when they should have been deemed uncopyrightable. Computer programs are 
in essence, functional, but that does not mean that creativity does not go into designing a computer 
program. The Third Circuit’s view that functional aspects of a computer program are copyrightable, so 
long as there are multiple ways to express it, is overly broad and would allow almost all functional 
aspects to be copyrightable, which would inhibit creativity. The First and Sixth Circuit’s view that 
functional aspects are not protectable by copyright is too narrow. Many functional aspects in a computer 
program have underlying creative non-functional aspects deemed uncopyrightable if using this approach. 
The Ninth Circuit’s abstraction-filtration-comparison is in between the two opposing views. Since the 
abstraction-filtration-comparison test allows certain creative non-functional aspects within functional 
aspects of a computer program to be copyrightable, it appears to be a better approach to the 
copyrightability of elements in a computer program. 
 The U.S. Supreme Court will likely find that the Federal Circuit’s conclusion was accurate when 
it found that the district court performed the merger analysis on the incorrect timeframe. The merger 
analysis does not apply at the time an infringer copies the work, but at the time the author created the 
work.249 In the Federal Circuit’s conclusion, it was correct in stating that the merger analysis did not apply 
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because there were multiple ways that the declaring code could have been expressed at the time it was 
created. The district court concluded that there was only one way to write the declaring code, but the 
district court failed to consider that the programmer could have expressed it in multiple ways when the 
programmer created the code. The district court’s conclusion is akin to saying that there is only one way 
of pressing the keys to type the word “computer” on a QWERTY keyboard; it is the only way because the 
creator set up the keys in a particular way when the creator created the QWERTY keyboard. However, 
suppose a person were to look at how to press the keys to create the word “computer” at the time of 
creation. In that case, the creator could have set up the keys in a variety of combinations. Only after the 
creator expressed the QWERTY keyboard’s keys in the creator’s particular way did the way of pressing 
the keys to type the word “computer” become the only way to do it. 
What the Federal Circuit Likely Got Wrong 
While the U.S. Supreme Court will likely find that the Federal Circuit may have gotten some 
things correct, the Supreme Court will likely find that the Federal Circuit also got some things wrong. 
First, the Supreme Court will likely find that the Federal Circuit’s analysis of the law on the standard of 
review for fair use and the court’s conclusion on that law was starkly incorrect. The Federal Court appears 
to have incorrectly analyzed a case where the Supreme Court explained how to determine a mixed 
question of law and fact as it applied in a bankruptcy proceeding.250 The Federal Court incorrectly stated 
that the Supreme Court opinion in U.S. Bank National Ass’n ex rel. CWCaptial Asset Management LLC v. 
Village at Lakeridge, LLC is “the standard of review . . . in connection with any mixed question of law 
and fact.”251 However, a person reading the Supreme Court’s opinion could identify that certain aspects of 
the opinion related only to bankruptcy proceedings.252 For example, when the Court discussed “historical” 
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facts, it identified that it was regarding bankruptcy.253 Because the Federal Circuit misconstrued the 
Supreme Court’s opinion, it deemed that only the historical facts were entitled to a deferential review 
while any other facts that the jury found were merely advisory. This is incorrect as all factual findings by 
a jury on review should be treated with deference. The Federal Circuit’s standard of review allowed it to 
make its own findings of fact, which ultimately led to a finding that Google’s use of the copyrighted 
material was not fair. 
The U.S. Supreme Court will likely find that the Federal Circuit’s fair use analysis was mistaken. 
In the Federal Circuit’s analysis of the first factor, the purpose and character of the use, the court looked 
at commerciality and transformative use. While the Federal Circuit’s finding that Google’s use was 
commercial was likely correct, it placed too much emphasis on its commerciality, stating that it was 
“overwhelmingly commercial.”254 The downfall of not merely the first-factor analysis but the entire fair 
use analysis was the Federal Circuit’s finding that Google’s use was not transformative. The Federal 
Circuit started by stating that, according to Ninth Circuit law, whether a work is transformative is a 
question of law255—that is incorrect. The Ninth Circuit never analyzed transformation as a question of 
law. The Ninth Circuit merely stated that whether a work is a parody is a question of law.256 In deciding 
that Google’s use was not transformative as a matter of law, the Federal Circuit gave flawed reasoning. 
One reason the Federal Circuit provided for why Google’s use was not transformative was that “it does 
not fit within the uses listed in the preamble to [17 U.S.C.] §107,”257 however, that list is not all-
inclusive.258 Another reason the Federal Circuit determined Google’s use was not transformative was that 
it served the same purpose in both platforms.259 This reason is unpersuasive. The Federal Circuit failed to 
 
253 “[A] bankruptcy court evaluating insider status must make findings of what we have called “basic” or “historical” 
fact—addressing questions who did what, when or where, how or why.” Id. at 966. 
254 Oracle America, Inc. v. Google LLC, 886 F.3d at 1198. 
255 Id. at 1199. 
256 “The issue of whether a work is a parody is a question of law, not a matter of public majority opinion.” Mattel 
Inc. v. Walking Mountain Productions, 353 F.3d 792, 801 (9th Cir. 2003). 
257 Oracle America, Inc. v. Google LLC, 886 F.3d at 1199. 
258 “[T]he fair use of a copyrighted work, . . . for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching . . . , 
scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of copyright.” 17 U.S.C. §107 (emphasis added). 
259 Oracle America, Inc. v. Google LLC, 886 F.3d at 1199. 
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consider the work as a whole, and instead, looked only at the copied material. Google reimplemented the 
declaring code and structure, sequence, and organization of API packages from the Java platform, which 
platform Sun created to work on desktop computers.260 Google used what it copied in a transformative 
way, including using its own implementing code, which allowed the copied material to work in an 
environment that they could not work before, the touchscreen mobile smartphone.261 Furthermore, the 
Federal Circuit failed to consider Google’s stated purpose for using the declaring code and the structure, 
sequence, and organization of thirty-seven of Oracle’s API packages, to attain a degree of interoperability 
with the Java platform, which would make it easier for programmers to use both the Java and Android 
platforms. Reasonable jurors could have found that Google’s use was transformative and that the 
transformative use was enough to overcome that the use was commercial. The first-factor analysis should 
have weighed in favor of a finding of fair use. 
While the U.S. Supreme Court will likely find that the Federal Circuit’s analysis on the second 
factor, the nature of the copyrighted work, is correct, the Supreme Court will likely find that the Federal 
Circuit’s comment that the factor “has less significance to the overall analysis” is not.262 The Supreme 
Court has stated that courts are not to treat the statutory factors in isolation and that courts should consider 
all factors and “the results weighed together, in light of the purposes of copyright.”263 The second factor 
may, at times, have less weight than the other factors, but it is not less significant than the other factors. If 
the factor was not important, why would Congress include it as a factor that courts must consider when 
determining fair use? 
The U.S. Supreme Court will likely find that the Federal Circuit’s analysis of the third factor, the 
amount and substantiality of the copyrighted work used, is without merit. Instead of looking at the portion 
used from the copyrighted work as a whole, the Federal Circuit looked at the amount of code necessary to 
 
260 Oracle America, Inc. v. Google Inc., No. C 10-03451 WHA, 2016 WL 3181206, at *9 (N.D. Cal. June 8, 2016), 
rev'd and remanded sub nom. Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google LLC, 886 F.3d 1179 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 
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write in the Java language, finding that Google copied more than necessary.264 However, that is not what 
a court looks at for this factor. Google copied only a small amount of code when looked at in proportion 
to the total amount of code in the Java platform.265 Although the Federal Circuit found this factor neutral, 
the court also said that it could also weigh against a finding of fair use. Because the amount of code that 
Google copied was small in proportion to the total amount of code in the Java platform, and, according to 
Google, it copied no more than what was necessary “to preserve inter-system consistency in usage,” even 
if the factor does not weigh in favor of a finding of fair use, the factor should not weigh against a finding 
of fair use; thus, the factor should be neutral in the analysis.266 
Finally, the U.S. Supreme Court will likely find that the Federal Circuit’s analysis of the fourth 
factor, the effect on the market for the copyrighted work, is overstated. The Federal Circuit stated that “no 
reasonable jury could have concluded that there was no market harm to Oracle from Google’s 
copying.”267 While there was evidence that Android produced actual market harm to the Java platform, as 
shown by Amazon renegotiating a better deal on a license with Oracle, a reasonable jury could have 
found that the market harm was not severe. Furthermore, the Federal Circuit reasoned that there was 
potential market harm as Java has the right to enter the smartphone market.268 However, that market was a 
market that they already attempted to enter. A different version of the Java platform, Java Micro 
Edition,269 was in mobile phones, but revenue from that platform had declined.270 Furthermore, because 
Sun made the Java API free under an open-source license, the jury could have found that there could be 
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no market harm as the Java API was already free.271 Therefore, the Federal Circuit should have found 
only minimal market harm to Oracle. 
Reweighing all factors, the U.S. Supreme Court will likely find that the Federal Circuit should 
have found that Google’s use of the declaring code and the structure, sequence, and organization of thirty-
seven of Oracle’s API packages as fair. 
IV. Conclusion 
Free reimplementation of software interfaces has been an important long-standing practice for 
software innovation. Given this long-standing practice in the software industry, the Supreme Court likely 
will not completely upend the industry by ruling that the declaring code and the structure, sequence, and 
organization of API packages are protected under copyright and that Google’s use of those was not fair.  
The Supreme Court could simply hold that the Federal Circuit did not properly apply the correct 
standard of review for the fair use defense and remand the case to the appellate court to apply the correct 
standard of review. However, this ruling is not likely as it would allow other similar disputes to percolate 
up to the Supreme Court and provide no more clarity to the uncertainty faced in the field of copyrights in 
computer programming. 
Given the line of questioning asked by the Justices during the oral argument, the Supreme Court 
will likely find that the declaring code and the structure, sequence, and organization of thirty-seven of 
Oracle’s API packages are protectable under copyright law. However, the Supreme Court will likely find 
that Google’s use of the copyrighted material was fair. This ruling would not wholly upend the software 
industry as courts could still find fair use when programmers reimplement software interfaces. However, 
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